Recent decades have witnessed a revival of interest in ancient friendship both as a normative and as an explanatory concept. The literature concurs in holding Hobbes responsible for the marginalisation of friendship in political science and suggests that Hobbes devalued friendship because of his understanding of man. This paper argues that although Hobbes's appraisal of friendship hinges on his assumption that man is self-interested, his critique of normative friendship does not rest on that notion. Hobbes's challenge to us is this: without foundation in the 'truth' (i.e. the 'Good Life') that underpinned ancient friendship, modern friendship, whether self-interested or selfless, cannot be assumed to be a civic virtue, nor an index of the health of a political association, nor a facilitator of domestic or global peace.
original characteristics of the concept; next, it examines Hobbes's appraisal of the explanatory value of friendship; next, it discusses Hobbes's critique of ancient philia as a political and ethical norm; finally, it highlights the relevance of Hobbes's argument to contemporary debates.
Hobbesian Friendship and its Marks
By all accounts, the meaning of friendship is highly contextual (Silver 1989) ; it can vary across cultures at one time and across times in one culture (Konstan 1997, 8-11; Derrida 1997, 366-7) . Here, I will not attempt a comparison of Aristotelian and Hobbesian friendship; rather, I shall review Hobbes's understanding of Aristotelian philia and compare it with his own notion of friendship in order to highlight certain shared qualities.
Hobbes was well-acquainted with the works of Aristotle and 'among the Hobbes papers at Chatsworth there is a free digest from the Nicomachean Ethics' (Strauss 1963, 42) ; he elucidates the meaning of Aristotelian friendship in his abridgement of Aristotle's Rhetoric. 4 Here Hobbes highlights the reciprocity of love and trust required in Aristotelian friendship, the selflessness and altruism entailed in the relationship, as well as the exchange of benefits that may take place between friends (Art of Rhetoric 454-6). Hobbes appears to have had a good ear for Aristotlelian philia (EN 8.2 1155b34 ; EN 8.3 1156a EN 8.3 -1158a EN 9.4 1166a31-2) as his account of friendship agrees with the interpretations of modern-day commentators: they, too, highlight 'reciprocity' (Konstan 1997, 69; Pangle 2003, 38; Schollmeier 1994, 38) and 'goodwill' (Konstan 1997, 74; Pangle 2003, 39; Price 1989, 138-9, 197; Schollmeier 1994, 35-39) as central ingredients of the relationship; they stress the importance of the Aristotelian typology of friendship, based respectively on utility, pleasure, and virtue (Nussbaum 1986, 354-372) ; they emphasise the 'altruism' and selflessness of perfect or true or virtue friendship (Konstan 1997, 76, 101; Schollmeier 1994, 51, 7-15; ) , and the selfinterest inherent to imperfect friendships (Price 1989, 131-161) .
Hobbes left us no detailed definition of his own conception of friendship, however, and so the key elements or (to use Hobbes's terminology) the 'marks' of Hobbesian friendship must be reconstructed from scattered remarks.
Hobbes was a nominalist (Pettit 2008 , Zarka 2016 and held that there is 'nothing in the world universal but names' (Leviathan, 17; Elements, 20; 34, 52) . He maintained that particular men differ from one another, that the same man is different at different times (Leviathan, 21) , and that what is constant in the same man, and common to all men, is the functioning of the body ('vital motion') and of the mind ('voluntary motion'). Hobbes identified man with 'motion ' (De Corpore, 137) , which he defined as 'actual power', and attributed to him the endless search for 'power', which he defined as 'potential motion', in order to prolong his existence as motion. This brief reminder helps us to appreciate the first characteristic that Hobbes attributes to friendship, namely empowerment: 'to have friends is power' (Leviathan, 50). Hobbes's claim that friends are 'power' therefore equates to the statement that friends contribute to the formation and establishment of the identity of the Hobbesian man as 'motion'.
Secondly, Hobbes refers to friendship as a 'contract' (Elements, 44) and maintains that when a friend bestows a gift or good turn upon another, he expects something in return (Elements, 84) . Given this contractual foundation, Hobbesian friendship requires trust and a positive disposition between contractors (Elements, 84); this inevitably fails in the Hobbesian state of nature (as discussed below). For Hobbes, then, friendship is not a relationship between 'self' and 'other' that can exist in a cultural vacuum. Rather, in order to materialise, friendship requires a context (common language, shared values, trust, positive dispositions) that in Hobbes's theory is made possible only by the creation of the political state.
Thirdly, the balance of evidence suggests that Hobbes saw advantage as the most common motivation for friendship; 5 however, he also mentions 'the love men bear to one another, or the pleasure they take in one another's company' (Elements, 43) and remarks that 'perpetual solitude is hard for a man to bear by nature or as a man' (Citizen, 24). These statements have led some interpreters to maintain that Hobbesian men are 'capable of benevolence and of genuine affection for other people, or concern for their good' (Rawls 2007, 45-6; see also Gert 2010, 63) .
To summarise, Hobbesian friendship is generally, but not always, driven by self-interest toward the end-goal of empowerment; it resembles a contract allowing the exchange of benefits or favours between contractors, who in turn must be positively disposed and trusting towards one another. Hence, we may loosely relate Hobbes's notion of friendship to the Aristotelian emphasis on the reciprocity of good will; of the three types of friendship mentioned by Aristotle, Hobbes regards utility-based friendship as the most common. The language of exchange and contract used by Hobbes to convey the mutuality of friendship reminds us of a market society (Pagden 1987) and arguably shows the early-modern transformation of the classical concept while retaining some of its original characteristics.
Hobbes's Appraisal of the Explanatory Value of Friendship
In Hobbes's political works, we encounter leagues, confederacies, partial societies, systems, corporations, and factions. I describe the bond that holds agents together in such groupings as 'self-interested friendship' (even if Hobbes does not employ the expression)
because it bears the 'marks' of Hobbesian friendship: it is contractual in nature, it entails the exchange of benefits or favours, and it promotes empowerment and self-interest while relying on reciprocity of trust and of positive disposition.
This section arranges leagues, confederacies, partial societies, systems, factions, and personal friendships into three categories: friendship-for-defence, friendship-forcommodious-living, and personal friendship. The typology is mine and is made mainly for ease of exposition; it is not rigid because in Hobbes's argument, a 'system' created to enable commodious living can easily develop into a defensive alliance, and so on.
My aim here is to show that, with one proviso, Hobbes attributes limited explanatory power to the concept of friendship: friendship cannot explain how men can attain and maintain peace. The proviso is that, for Hobbes, friendship can explain phenomena that undermine peace, such as corruption and favouritism.
Leagues, Alliances, Confederacies, Factions, and Friendship-for-Defence
If the enemy were to go away, [the friend] is no longer, it seems, a friend to us. (Plato, Lysis 220e, trans. Ludwig 2010, 134) One narrative that runs through the Western tradition, from Plato to Carl Schmitt and postmodernity, is that friendship brings people together against enemies (Ludwig 2010 Thus, although defensive friendships arise in natural conditions (Tuck 1999, 134) , they must ultimately fail (Gauthier 1969; Hampton 1986 To summarise, Hobbesian leagues, confederacies, and factions can be interpreted as practices of friendship-for-defence, a relation based on self-interest that assumes enmity, man's vulnerability, rationality, and fear. Hobbes, in contrast to preceding narratives (e.g.
Plato), attributes a very limited explanatory value to defensive friendship; for him the concept cannot explain how we come to live in political associations.
Corporations, Partial Societies, Systems, and Friendship-for-Commodious-Living
Friendship also seems to hold the polis together…For concord seems to be something similar to friendship. (Aristotle NE VIII 1155a22-26)
Civic friendship is according to utility. (Aristotle EE 7.10.1242b22-3)
Another narrative one encounters in the Western tradition is that friendship holds citizens together not in response to enmity but on account of man's inability to live comfortably without the assistance of others. This type of utility friendship is at the core of Aristotle's account of political associations (e.g. EE 1236a33-37); indeed Aristotle maintained that 'friendship seems to hold the polis together' (NE VIII.1155a24). This type of civic friendship can be found in the writings of a variety of thinkers, from Cicero to Jean Ferguson (1995, 38) .
Even though Hobbes does not employ the expression, he too, acknowledges the occurrence of friendship-for-commodious-living within the commonwealth and refers to it as 'forensis quaedam amicitia' in the Latin De Cive (1983, 90) . 7 The Hobbesian man's drive to enter the social contract is born not only from fear for his life but also from a desire to enjoy 'commodious living' (Leviathan, 78). He longs for the 'ornaments and comforts of life which by peace and society are usually invented and procured' (Elements, 73; Citizen, . For the sake of a comfortable existence, Hobbesian citizens create a network of corporations, systems, and partial societies. These have attracted the attention of historians, jurists, and political theorists -some examine the genealogy of Hobbes's partial societies (Gierke 2001) while others emphasise the proto-liberal elements of Hobbes's international corporations (Malcolm 2002; Sorell 2006) , and others still point to intermediate societies as evidence of Hobbes's 'political realism' (Bobbio 1993, 174) .
Hobbes mentions partial societies only briefly in Elements and Citizen but devotes a whole chapter to the topic in Leviathan. 8 Here, Hobbes describes the substructures within the body politic as 'systems' and explains that the term refers to 'any numbers of men joined in one interest or one business', driven together 'by design or inclination' (Leviathan, 146). In
Hobbes's account, 'system' denotes a diverse array of corporations and societies, from churches to universities, and from guilds of merchants to bands of thieves. Hobbes writes that there is 'an unspeakable diversity' of systems in a political association; their number is 'almost infinite' (Leviathan, 149). Men choose which systems to join -a university or a merchants' corporation -based on their individual preferences, inclinations and designs.
Ultimately, it is the Hobbesian man's search for a good life that motivates him to join a system. Indeed, Hobbes concludes that an important reason to prefer monarchy over democracy is that a single individual is likely to have fewer personal friends (and thus fewer opportunities to display favouritism) than an assembly (Smith 2008 ).
To summarise, Hobbes believed that personal friendships can easily spill from the private into the public domain, and are therefore very much a concern for the political philosopher and for the state. While friendship-for-defence and friendship-for-commodiousliving cannot explain how agents attain and maintain peace, Hobbes suggests that personal friendships can explain phenomena that undermine peace, such as conspiracies, factionalism, corruption, cronyism, and favouritism.
Hobbes's concerns about the link between friendship, corruption and favouritism were already present in the ancient world (Herman 1987, 156-161) as was the awareness of the connection between friendship , wrong-doing, and conspiracies (Cicero 1991b, 94 ff) ; the ancients, however, denied that such relationships could be viewed as true or virtue friendship (Cicero1991b, 94-95) . This brings us to discuss Aristotelian virtue friendship, and Hobbes's critique of it.
Hobbes's Critique of Ancient Normative Friendship
The literature agrees that Hobbes rejected ancient virtue friendship (von Heyking and Avramenko 2008, 6) and that Aristotelian arguments regarding true friendship 'have no place in the Hobbesian scheme' (Smith 2008, 214-5, 219 
The Caring Conspirator
An epicurean or a Hobbist readily allows, that there is such a thing as friendship in the world, without hypocrisy or disguise (Hume 1970, 296-7) .
Virtue friendship is considered one of the most challenging parts of Aristotle's Ethics (Mulgan 2000, 15) and has generated much debate among specialists; Aristotelian scholars disagree on whether utility, pleasure, and virtue friendship are points on a continuum (so that even utility friendship contains some virtue, and virtue friendship contains some utility), or whether they are different in kind; they offer contrasting opinions on whether virtue friendship describes a practice or if it serves mainly as an ideal; they also offer different explanations on how virtue friendship relates to human flourishing and to the Aristotelian notions of 'the Good Life' and of 'the contemplative life'.
In spite of the complexities and subtleties of the Aristotelian concept, it can be argued that in his abridgement of Aristotle's Rhetoric, Hobbes captures a core ingredient of Aristotelian virtue friendship, namely one's willingness and ability to care for the other as 'a second self' (NE 1166a1-19; EE 1240a36-b20); he reminds us that for Aristotle 'a friend is he that loves, and he that is beloved', that 'to love is to will well to another, and that for others, not for our own sake'(Hobbes, Art of Rhetoric 454), and that 'a friend is he; that rejoiceth at another's good. And that grieves at his hurt' (455).
The first question to address is whether Hobbes's notion of man ruled out the altruism and selflessness that Aristotle ascribed to true friends. Granted that Hobbes highlighted the widespread unfriendliness of men towards strangers as well as the human tendency to be self- Hobbesian men all of the time.
' I "ought" implies for Hobbes, "I can"' (Plamenatz 1965,76) 
The Foundation of Hobbesian Friendship
I want to say first of all that friendship can exist only between good men. (Cicero 1991b, 86) And depraved though they are, do not conspirators aid and comfort one another, and share common desires? (Hobbes, 479) Interpreters agree that Aristotelian friendship was grounded in the notion of 'the Good Life' (Mulgan 2000, 15) while Thomistic friendship was underpinned by the belief in God (Schwartz 2007) ; they emphasise that while 'the Good Life' and God represented a 'truth' that ancient and medieval writers did not invent but acknowledged, modern friendship is not 'ordered to anything beyond itself' (Schall 1996, 135; Fortin 1993) . As a result, in modernity, friendship came to indicate 'an "I-Thou" relationship' that 'presumes that there are no preestablished, naturally knowable, or divinely ordained ends in the attainment of which human beings find their perfection' (Fortin 1993, 47 ). Montaigne's essay on friendship (1991) is regarded as 'part of the struggle of ancients and moderns' (Schall, 1996, 130) ; his famous remark that he was friend to Estienne de la Boete 'Because it was he, because it was I' (Montaigne 1991, 192) captures the trend of modern friendship:
When the friend does not exist in truth, that is, when both friends do not have a common good in which each exists, they become laws unto each other, precisely what they cannot be in friendship as Aristotle understood it (Schall 1996, 134 (Gert 2010, 65) . Hobbes scorned the ancient belief that 'not the evil but the good have friends' as 'patently false'(Anti-White, 479). He held that genuine love, care, and selflessness can occur among the 'depraved' just as it can among obedient citizens.
On the other hand, Hobbes did not endorse the emerging model of modern friendship whereby 'friends become laws unto each other' (Schall 1996, 134) ; indeed, in his theory, when men become laws unto each other, anarchy materialises. As is well-known, Hobbes maintained that a major reason why the state of nature descends into a state of war is that men naturally disagree on what is good and evil; they create the Leviathan to put an end to such quarrels.
It can be argued that, in response to what he regarded as the flawed foundation of ancient friendship (the 'Good Life') and the dangers associated with the emerging individualistic model of friendship, Hobbes provided a new foundation for friendship: the state. In his theory, the Leviathan will decide which practices of friendship are good or bad and will use peace as its measure. From Hobbes's perspective, it is not the presence of selfinterest that makes friendship imperfect; it is not the degree of selflessness or true love that makes it a virtue. Rather, friendship should be judged by its effect on the good of the commonwealth -in short, its effect on peace: the friendship of conspirators may include love and selflessness but nevertheless destroys the commonwealth; the friendship of merchants is likely to be driven by calculations of self-interest but may nevertheless facilitate commodious living and foster peace.
Hobbes's foundation of friendship is different from the 'naturally knowable truth' (Schall 1996) that grounded ancient and medieval friendship 10 ; although the Leviathan's decisions about friendships are not arbitrary but guided by the laws of nature that recommend peace, they are all the same discretionary.
Conclusions
[I]t is not clear that friendship and politics mix all that well. (Shklar [1987 (Shklar [ ] 1998 This paper started with the observation that there has been a revival of interest in ancient philia as a normative and an explanatory concept, and that Thomas Hobbes is regarded as largely responsible for the devaluation and marginalisation of friendship in political science. It maintained that the literature has shown insufficient curiosity in investigating Hobbes's concerns with ancient philia. This paper sought to rectify this lacuna.
First, I examined the explanatory potential that Hobbes assigned to the concept of friendship. Hobbes's texts acknowledge an ontological quality to friendship; indeed, Hobbes suggests that friends are a source of a man's identity and recognition by others. This distances him ideologically from later writers, such as Carl Schmitt, who saw the enemy rather than the friend as crucial to the development of one's political identity. Moreover, by maintaining that all friendships ultimately fail in the state of nature, Hobbes indicates that friendship is not a relationship between 'self' and 'other' that can take place in a cultural vacuum, but a relation that requires a communal context (including a common language and shared values) in order to materialise. In this way, Hobbes anticipates insights developed by later philosophers who portrayed friendship not as a dyadic but as a triadic relationship, involving self, other, and context.
Next, I argued that, for Hobbes, friendship cannot help explain events and circumstances of utmost political relevance, namely how men attain and maintain peace and why they institute political authority, legal justice, and private property. Hobbes does acknowledge that 'a constant civil amity' is key to a healthy political association (Leviathan, 489), but maintains that the common recognition of authority and not friendship is crucial to this outcome. For Hobbes, friendship does not create the conditions of the political; rather, the political creates the conditions for friendship. Friendship does not prevent tumult or civil war; indeed, in such circumstances people have no hesitation 'to throw stones to their own best friends' (Leviathan, 42), in spite of noticeable exceptions (Hobbes pays tribute to Sidney Godolphin). Ultimately, in Hobbes's argument, the main explanatory merit of friendship is that it can shed light on phenomena such as corruption, favouritism, nepotism, and cronyism;
it can illustrate how sects and conspiracies are born and grow.
Next, the paper argued that Hobbes's main concern was to undermine the ancient belief that friendship could serve as a political or ethical norm. Hobbes's nominalism and materialism prevented him from accepting the foundation of Aristotelian virtue friendship, namely 'the Good Life', that had led Aristotle to maintain that true friendship (which is selfless and character building) is superior to self-interested friendship, and that only virtuous men are capable of the former. Hobbes rejected Aristotelian teleology and suggested that the distinction between self-interested and selfless friendship is politically irrelevant in so far as both can occur among obedient and disobedient citizens.
By discarding the concept of 'the Good Life' that underpinned Aristotle's virtue friendship, and by claiming that conspirators are as capable of true friendship as obedient citizens, Hobbes contributed significantly to the view that friendship may be a 'school of virtue' as much as a 'school of vice' and that it is therefore an ambivalent phenomenon -a view which some call the hallmark of modernity (Lewis 1960, 97) . Hobbes was particularly influential on our current conception of politics (Stauffer, 2016, 481) , and his appraisal of friendship resonates with current thinking. Common parlance acknowledges the potential gap between the quality of the bonds of friendship and the moral character of the friends themselves: we say that close-knit companions are as thick as thieves. Moreover, the close connection between friendship and corruption and favouritism is a recurring concern (de Graaf and Huberts 2008; 11 Roman and Miller 2014) as is the challenge that friendship poses to justice (Cordelli 2015) .
The paper also argued that Hobbes did not endorse the emerging early modern model of friendship, whereby friendship is a private affair (Hutson 2011) and friends become 'laws unto each other' ( Schall 1996, 134) . For Hobbes, any personal relationship can potentially acquire political significance; he foresaw what later writers would stress, namely that disobedience, resistance, and opposition to governments start with meetings among friends (Shklar 1998; Digeser 2016) and that religious sects, political factions, conspiracies, rebellions, are all born within friendships (Lewis 1960, 96-7) . Hobbes understood the dangers of letting friends becoming laws unto each other and offered a new foundation for friendship:
the Leviathan, that guided by the laws of nature, would decide which 'systems' of friendship are the potential 'muscles' of the commonwealth, and which are its 'wens, biles, and apostems'.
Hobbes's argument on friendship-in particular, his view that all men, good or bad, are (4) and to demonstrate that her notion of civic friendship can bring unity to modern democracies and sustain justice. She acknowledges that a contemporary theory of civic friendship can no longer rely on the ancient notion of the Good Life (67) but points out that this does not compel us to accept neutrality of values: the 'Aristotelian concern with the moral virtue of one's fellow citizens' can be replaced by 'a more tolerant, enlightened concern …with their political character' (66). She maintains that '[a] feasible modern political friendship will be evidenced by a certain degree of concern, good will, and practical agreement between citizens regarding primarily constitutional essentials' (67 italics in the original). She explains:
If we consider the attempt to embody a doctrine of universal equality between persons in legal institutions of right (again attempted in the Constitution), we have a clear instance of what I am calling "civic friendship" (Schwarzenbach, 2009, 188) Attention to the underpinning of Schwarzenbach's concept of civic friendship sheds light on the challenge facing modern theories of friendship, as identified by Hobbes. Even though some interpreters have suggested that 'Schwarzenbach updates Aristotle's approach' (Digeser 2016, 128) , in fact Schwarzenbach's and Aristotle's concepts of friendship do not share the same status: the latter was a 'truth' that Aristotle did not invent but acknowledged (Fortin 1993) ; the former, depends on people's agreement on a set of values. The different foundation of Schwarzenbach's friendship vis-à-vis Aristotle's raises questions such as: how likely is it that all members of a concrete liberal democracy agree on the same ideal of 'political life', on the same understanding of 'constitutional essentials', on the same norm of civic friendship? Wouldn't the implementation of any specific notion or practice of civic friendship foster the rise of opposition and enmity within societies? Would it not require substantial intervention into citizens' life by the state?
Hobbes's challenge to us is this: once the truth (the 'Good Life', God) that grounded ancient and medieval friendship is discarded, any concept or practice of friendship (in either selfless or self-interested form) can engender opposition and disagreement among men; the only way to ensure that friendship fosters amity and does not breed enmity is to entrust the mighty Leviathan with its management and direction 12 .
From a Hobbesian perspective, liberal theories of friendship are utopian not because they assume that man is, by nature or education, capable of love, care and altruism (man is capable of all of these things) but because they presume that friendship is a civic virtue and a facilitator of concord and reconciliation in the absence of a fixed reference point, be it 3 The rarity of references to 'friend' or 'friendship' in Hobbes's political works is not only striking but puzzling. The revival of friendship had been the distinctive feature of the English Renaissance (Hutson 2011) and books dealing with friendship by Cicero (1991a Cicero ( , 1991b and Erasmus (2001) had been best-sellers and could be found in every English gentleman's library (Mills 1937) . Thus, in view of the rhetorical and divulgation purposes of his Leviathan (Skinner 1996) , it is surprising that Hobbes makes virtually no mention of civic friendship in it, regardless of how much such references would have been expected by his readers. Indeed, Hobbes would have had good reasons to provide some discussion of public or civic friendship within Leviathan in order to persuade his readers of the possibility of 'a constant made Hobbes wary of ancient friendship. Although Cicero had argued that 'a true friend' could never ask one to 'set fire to the Capitol ' (1991b, 94) , another narrative was present in classical antiquity, which associated friendship 'in the popular mind with courage, republicanism, and with the spirited resistance to injustice and tyranny' (Pangle 2003, 1; Derrida 1997, 15) . The story of the 'completely loyal friendship' between Phintias and Damon (Valerius Maximus 2004, 152) , which had captured the ancient imagination ( Cicero 1991a 116-7) , shows that individuals capable of perfect friendship may very well be imperfect citizens.
10 For Hobbes, 'truth' is a property of propositions (Leviathan 19).
11 ' She never received money for the corrupt acts. Her reward was love, if you can call it that': this is an excerpt from a detective's statement about a Dutch embassy official who issued visas on false grounds out of selfless love for friends; it illustrates the findings of a study according to which 'next to material gain, the most important motives for officials to become corrupt are friendship or love, status, and making an impression on colleagues and friends '(de Graaf and Huberts 2008, 643 practices of friendship, the partiality of friendship, the problems that friendship can cause to justice, the dangerous link between friendships, cronyism, corruption, factionalism and conspiracies, the impossibility of extending friendship to all members of a large society.
Unlike Hobbes, however, Digeser gives insufficient attention to the fact that some practices of friendship may target the existence of other practices of friendship or indeed have as their goal the destruction of the whole social network of friendships.
